“After years of silence the President has decided to speak to the world. He wants to set the record straight on a number of important issues, including the reasons behind the war and relations between the Arabs and the United States.” In 1982 the Iran-Iraq war was in its third year and the prominent colours in the streets of Baghdad were military khaki and the black of mourning. The soldiers and women looked war weary. Nobody expected the war to last this long. And there was no relief in sight.

Even Saddam Hussein’s most ardent loyalists were beginning to have their doubts about the war’s eventual outcome. In Iran Ayotallah Khomeini was adamant in his rejection of Iraq’s peace overtures. The UN proved ineffective and the superpowers manifested no interest in bringing the bloodshed to an end.

For Iraq, there were serious subsidiary problems. The oil-rich Arab countries which had financed Saddam’s war effort were tiring of the whole business. The weight of numbers, the human wave tactics employed by the Iranians and some reluctance by Iraqis to die defending their country were beginning to show results. The Iranians appeared to have a number of young people willing to throw themselves on Israeli tanks and the number of Iraqi soldiers surrendering to the enemy increased. More importantly there was no prospect of victory. Iran was too large to be conquered.

Reading between the lines I decided that Saddam Hussein was in trouble -- why else would he want to address the world? My trepidations were confirmed a mere week after the announcement that ‘the time to speak had come.’ An Iraqi Ministry of Information official and a member of President Saddam’s staff met with me and entrusted me with arranging a visit to Baghdad to interview Saddam by members of a major news organization, preferably American. According to one of my contacts, Ghazi Al Ayash, “the hero-President’s message to the world is best transmitted through an exclusive interview. This is bigger than going on Radio Baghdad to speak to the Iraqi people.”

I had been an ad hoc consultant to the Iraqi government for some time. My most recent assignments focused on US-Iraqi relations and how they might be improved. The new assignment was more important, the manner and emphasis of the people involved told me that the idea came from Saddam himself. Saddam had decided to make an appeal to America for help to end the war.

Obviously my previous reports on what to do regarding relations with the US had had an impact. In fact, having had no diplomatic relations with Iraq since the 1967 War, the Iraqis were groping for ways to endear themselves to America. An American citizen and sometime foreign correspondent I was one of the people the Iraqis trusted. It was Saddam’s half-brother Barazan, the then head of the security apparatus of the country, who had asked if I were willing to represent Iraq in Washington. There was no follow up to that question. I never had to answer it

I accepted my new assignment readily. I had no problem helping Saddam subject himself to the judgement of world opinion. I thought it was good for the Arabs, indeed accepting the judgement of the world might lead to a softening in the policies of Saddam’s regime. But above all I loathed Khomeini. The two problems facing me were not shared with my Iraqi friends. The big one was reconciling Saddam’s inflated image of himself with what the Americans thought of him. The second problem was the timing of the request, whether he was speaking from a position of weakness which the interview might reveal with untold consequences to all involved, especially me.

Saddam thought very highly of himself. Not without reason, he never tired of stating that ‘ America should treat Iraq as an equal because Iraq was a rare success story of the Third World. Iraq will lead in the Arab and Muslim arenas and America should accept this.’ The Americans were dismissive of this. True, America was utterly opposed to Khomeini and Islamic fundamentalism and the hostage crisis had left its mark on their national honour. There was a case for backing Saddam against Khomeini. America seemed to want both sides to lose, but realistically Iraq was the only country capable of facing the menace of Khomeini.

To me, what Saddam needed was a news weekly. A news weekly with high circulation, perhaps a cover story on Saddam, on either Time or Newsweek. Television would have been better, but Saddam’s English wasn’t up to it. Consequently, my plans to approach Time magazine were approved by him in a day. Saddam wanted this done fast. Was he afraid of the mounting cost of the war? -- or was there a possibility if his army collapsing or rising against him?

I established contact with Time magazine though my father, himself a Time correspondent. Then I made a trip to New York to meet Richard Duncan, Time’s chief of correspondents. Duncan listened and, after making it abundantly clear that Time was not in the business of promising people cover stories, he accepted the invitation I was authorized to issue. We agreed that extreme care had to be taken in selecting Saddam’s interviewers.

However simple and superficial the Iraqi request was, both sides were beginning to think something big might come of it. The Iraqis added to the atmosphere of excitement by telling me that Iraq’s turn to capitalism was uppermost in Saddam’s mind. According to his people, Saddam personally had planned and supervised the adoption of capitalist measures in the country. In fact, most of the old guard of the Ba’ath party had opposed his measures. The opposition to Saddam’s capitalist measures was another reason for Saddam to rely on his family and tribe instead of a collection of out-of-step socialist idealogues. In whispers, I was told that Saddam intended to be critical of socialism and the Soviet Union’s wish to export it to the Middle East.

On hearing the news, the Time people were incredulous. Perhaps America’s and Europe’s efforts to pry Iraq loose from the USSRs embrace was working. For Saddam to criticise the USSR openly represented a major shift in the balance of power in the Middle East. To neutral observers what Saddam was embarking on an effort to distance himself from the USSR. By the sound of things Saddam believed that Iraqi ways and socialist dogma were incompatible. When the people of Iraq spoke Saddam became a good listener.

Three days after senior editor Murray Gart and correspondent Dean Brelis arrived in Baghdad, they were taken to Saddam’s office early in the morning – without prior warning. Saddam’s chief aide de camp telephoned me in London “your boys are on their way. They will be with the hero-president in five minutes.’ It was July and the holy month of Ramadan and the streets of Baghdad were relatively empty. The fact that Saddam was seeing Gart and Brelis in Ramadan added to the importance of the interview. The Time team, aware that Saddam personally ran the war with Iran, had expected an abbreviated meeting. To his aides, Saddam’s determination to have the world hear him had become an obsession. He saw the interview as the only way to win America’s support.

The uneasy and irregular communications between the two countries aside, he wanted America to stop the war. It was his only hope. His original assessment of forcing Iran to sue for peace was a thing of the past, and conquering Iran was beyond his capability and dreams.

The gambler in Saddam replaced the calculating, methodical monster.

Accustomed to interviewing the high and mighty in the world, Gart and Brelis entered Saddam’s office and, without promoting, walked over to where he stood and shook his hand. Gart was struck by Saddam’s exceptionally soft handshake. There was also a small smile on his face, though everybody had told Gart not to expect one.

Gart’s experienced eyes took in the place and the man who occupied it. The first and most obvious surprise was Saddam’s attempt to avoid eye contact. There was no mistaking it, the man was shy. People interpret shy to mean gentle. This is not so, a shy person can be a killer. It didn’t stop there and Saddam’s smile expanded into a broad beam. Gart decided that Saddam was waging a charm offensive. Rightly, Gart decided something important was afoot. Saddam’s manner and movements attested to this. The sense of power he possessed was there, but so was the smiling populist.

Saddam motioned Gart and Brelis to sit on one of the settees in the corner of his office and sat opposite to them. The translator stood behind him. The first translation was a Saddam apology for keeping them waiting for two days. The war, or running it placed unusual demands on his time. He also regretted the things they couldn’t see during Ramadan. Then smiling for a second time he offered his visitors a drink. They declined the offer, thanked him for receiving them during the Muslim holy month at a critical time in the war. Iran had launched an offensive the week before.

Preambles out of the way, both sides were anxious to begin. Gart had prepared several pages of questions. Saddam told them it was his first interview in years and blamed himself and his government for not doing more to keep the US government and the people informed of developments in the Arab world. To Saddam, the two sides were under an obligation to communicate. He warned that lack of movement in relations between the two countries was necessary to avoid misunderstandings. ‘The door to America is open.’

Gart was trying to control the interview but Saddam was determined to give the meeting a specific direction. “The Americans think we are a socialist country, that Iraq follows the Soviet Union.This is not true, it has never been true. As Iraqis we have our own history and traditions. For good or bad our history and culture dictates the economic policies we pursue. We follow programs that work here despite our friendship with the Soviet Union. It is our people who give us direction. Our friendship with the USSR does not mean that what works there works here. They understand that.

“Through constant contact with us the leaders of the Soviet Union understand other things as well. It took sometime, but they stopped the local Communist Party from trying to subvert us. With them we communicate.”

Murray Gart rose to the occasion and wanted to know more about Saddam’s economic policies. “What about imitating the other Arab countries? How about using what Nasser, your own Ba’ath party and other Arab socialist groups advocated? Have you, for example, adopted some of Nasser’s more successful measures?”

Saddam was forced into amplifying his earlier statement, but he was determined to tell what he had rehearsed, to avoid the past. Speaking of Nasser’s leadership of the 1950s and 1960s and the merger under him of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic (UAR) Saddam praised Nasser and his ideas. However, he reduced the contribution of the leading Arab politicians of the twentieth century and the most popular Arab leader since the prophet Mohamed to “the Nasser experiment. Nasser had a love-hate relationship with the America. We are more consistent. We have never expected America to be a friend, only to stop its one-sided policies towards our conflict with Israel. Also, we are people with a proud history, we want to be treated as equals.” It was an arrogant statement by an arrogant man.

In fact, Saddam studiously refused to cede anything to Nasser, even the Egyptian leader’s popularity got short shrift. He did admit that Nasser was a major influence on his life but he countered that by stating that Nasser was “word oriented,” while he, Saddam, was action oriented. Indeed it was no denying that he opened the doors of Iraq to all Arabs who wanted to move, live and work there. Saddam was also behind moving to Iraq of whole Egyptian and Moroccan villages. This experiment stopped with the war. The Iraqi government under him was the model Arab governments should emulate. To put things in perspective, Saddam insisted that Arab unity must come, but “gradually.” Instead of competing with Nasser by going to the Arab streets, Saddam worked towards making his country a magnet for the rest. He was making his own bid for Arab leadership his own way. “It is much more realistic to unite when the various parts of the Arab nation are at the same level of development. Unity has to come from the people, it cannot be dictated to them.”

About an hour and a half after the journalists arrived, Murray Gart decided that he was participating in one of the most important interviews he had ever conducted. Moreover, it was likely to be the most important one to come out of Iraq for a long time.

That Saddam was determined to make his own statements was a minor bother. Saddam had orchestrated this interview after cold calculations of what the results might be. He knew Arab-American relations were at an all-time low. He was after two things. He needed help to end the war and he was making a direct bid for leadership of the Arabs. A structured interview might produce good results but the damage it might do was very small indeed. He was running for “leader of the Arabs.” Certainly the more capable among the Arab leaders of his time, miles ahead of Muamar Gaddafi of Libya and the late King Hussain of Jordan. This is not to forget that California-size Iraq was a very wealthy country and that the Iraqi s had greater depth than the rest of the Arabs. Indeed it was only natural that Iraq would make a bid for Arab leadership.

Originally reluctant to have Saddam use them to make his highly personal statement they saw in the interview a different story from the one he had in mind. Looking at each other without saying a word, they decided Saddam was challenging America to rethink its Middle East policy. He wanted better relations with America and he was willing to make the necessary changes to achieve that, he expected America to give serious consideration to a bid for regional supremacy. When asked by Brelis why America’s support for Iraq was necessary, Saddam looked at him and smiled.

So the aim of the whole interview was to introduce and explain Saddam. Coming when it did and in the manner it did, it was a plea for understanding which went totally unanswered. Washington kept ignoring him. The United States government didn’t respond to him. This coincided with the first news of American double-dealing which included selling arms to Iran (Iran-Contra scandal). What happened, or didn’t happen, during this period paved the way for the disasters that followed. In the late 1960s Saddam suffered from a morbid belief that America was conspiring against him. Soon after, he unsuccessfully began courting America. By 1982, he reverted to not wanting to understand the American system of government or to believe American promises.

To Saddam,” The people standing up to Khomeini should be helped. If they are not helped, then America’s policies will backfire. What is it going to take to educate America into who should be helped and who should be opposed. Our main concern is raising the standard of living of our people. Surely this is something the capitalist powers understand.”

Noting that Saddam was a master of double-speak who spoke slowly but most of the time not to the point, Gart decided to confront him. “Mr President, why is Iraq the only Arab country that has not re-established diplomatic ties with the United States? A number of Arab countries broke relations after the 1967 war but except for Iraq, all of them, including Egypt and Syria, restored them. Why, Sir?”

“Well, we have always believed that the break in diplomatic relations after the 1967 War was the culmination of a long series of small and major misunderstandings. It wasn’t 1967 alone that made us act. It was the policies and attitude of the US government before, during and after the war. Without a change in what lead to the break restoring diplomatic relations is meaningless. It would be a betrayal of the Arab people. Never, we would never do that.

In citing unfriendly acts against the Arabs by the US, Saddam lumped America with Israel. As he saw it, Israel’s actions were totally dependent on the US. Without America’s support Israel didn’t have the resources to carry out a war. After alluding to the per capita support the United States gave Israel, the highest in the world, he returned to the prospects of good relations between the US and Iraq. “Of course, we wish for good relations with the US. Yours is a great country and a superpower. But your policies towards the Arab countries are wrong because you have little idea of what is happening in Iraq and other Arab countries. The image you have of us doesn’t exist. Perhaps it's an image made in Israel. Ask any taxi driver and people like that... talking to them tells you more about conditions in Iraq then what your reports do -- the reports you get. The people who advise you have a vested interest in Iraq and the US having bad relations, they would lose their jobs” This time the smile was genuine.

The rough accusations against the United States had nothing new in them, and he didn’t to dwell on them. Throughout there was reversion to Saddam’s obvious desire to have good relations with the US. He wanted to endear himself to America, to be seen as the embodiment of a new phase of US-Arab relations. He made it plain that he was aware of what bound America to Israel. Furthermore, he didn’t expect any change in that picture. But introducing a new non-socialist Iraq to America and adopting a friendly tone was likely to please the US government and American people. Saddam continued to discuss the changes in his economic policies.

“We are doing everything to change the economic policies of the country, Iraq was following policies unacceptable to our people. Historically, our people believe in free enterprise. The private sector is very important now, alongside the public sector. We are encouraging private ownership everywhere but we have to have guarantees that the average citizen will not suffer.

“Collective farms... The system was a Soviet mistake and we followed suit. When our people asked for collective farms to be dismantled, we listened to their reasons and put an end to the whole program. Our private sector in this area is flourishing. There are reasons behind it, including the financial help we offer -- without interest. We borrowed that idea from you. This works even in agriculture. People have been more productive as a result. I think they will be more productive in the future. Our people are hard working.”

A while later Gart expressed interest in knowing what effect the war with Iran was having on Iraq’s economy. “The war with Iran has cost both sides a great deal. We are committed to a policy of guns and butter. But the war has been costly. It will not end until the superpowers decide that is should end. If they don’t then it will continue for a long time. Iran has satellite pictures ......they are provided by a country that doesn’t the war to end. I am not accusing anybody, but someone is up to no good.

“We have made our position very clear to everybody who’s willing to listen. We have explained everything to the United Nations. We do not seek the territory of other countries, or to convert them to our way of thinking. We are at war because we have no option. Thousands of our sons have died defending our independence and identity, our country and honour of the Arab nation. We want a just solution but the big powers do nothing but watch. On the other hand every month that passes confirms that out decision (to go to war) was correct. Khomeini is superficial... he has no logic and he is out of step – with the world....We are stronger than they are....We sued for peace on 20 September 1980.... no answer. We didn’t do it out of weakness... we believe in peace...”

When Gart reverted to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the US, Saddam showed some irritation. “My advice to Reagan regarding his Middle East policy is don’t accept the Israeli stick or the idea of using a big stick... don’t exaggerate Israel’s strategic importance... The Arabs will continue to develop... our military quality is better than 1967... The competence of (our) fighters is different... Israel’ military superiority is diminishing by the day... the US should not use Israel against us... it would lose in the end...”

Later he responded to a question from Dean Brelis about his nuclear program. “We have signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty... we shall try to buy more than one (reactor)... we shall try to continue our atomic program... This is our right... we accept international supervision... but relations with the supplier will continue... why should we accept less than what other countries get...”

After five hours, Gart and Brelis offered to leave for a third time. When Saddam asked them if they had any questions they were reluctant to ask. Gart decided to expand the interview. He asked Saddam whether he, Saddam, was able to go to all parts of Baghdad, even the ones which were heavily Shia, like Al Karadeh. Saddam opened the middle drawer of his desk and pulled out a set of keys. “Let’s go...” He drove a large Mercedes car with Gart next to him and Brelis in the back. Nearly ten cars full of security people were in hot pursuit. Both Gart and Brelis believe this was a genuine Saddam move, that he had not rehearsed this. The head of Saddam’s office felt the same way. He was so concerned about the safety of the President he had a hard time recalling the state of panic the whole thing generated.

Saddam spoke of the history of streets and buildings as he drove by them and pointed out where some developments will take place. However, the first stop for Saddam was the conference building, especially constructed for the Non-aligned Nations Conference. Seeing a mural of Aladin, Saddam pointed to it and asked if American children knew that Aladin came from Iraq. When told very few did, he took a deep sigh and spoke of “Aladin fishing without getting the fish.”

After showing the journalists inside the impressive building he drove a short distance to a Shia mosque, then a shop and lastly he accepted an invitation by a woman who hailed him when she recognised him. The tour’s finale was a stop in the middle of Al Rashid Street where in 1599, he and Ba’athist comrades attempted to assassinate the then leader of Iraq, General Abdel Karin Kassem. Saddam had stories to tell about every stop they made but recalling the attempt on Kassem’s life gave him a special pleasure. He obviously believed that the assassination attempt paved the way for his advancement within the Ba’ath Party. It was the beginning of the Saddam we know today.

A small part of this extensive presentation, his longest ever interview, appeared in Time Magazine of 19 July 1982. Though not a cover story it painted a good picture of the Iraqi leader and his very angry self. His attempt at improving his relations with America through using its press failed. There was only one benefit. It was a landmark. It was the first and last direct try. After that several intermediaries carried messages from Saddam to America and the opposite and they did that until 1990 and the invasion of Kuwait.

Few months later the Iraqi government sent me to Washington for another investigation into US-Iraqi relations. Among other things I was to entice a major American bank to open a representative office in Baghdad. Former Fed Chairman and Treasury Secretary William Miller was probably the most enthusiastic supporter of this scheme. The US government knew that I was advising Saddam on his relations with them and encouraged me to continue. From then on, the Iraqi side told me that my reports were read by all, Saddam included, naturally with relish. At one point, Barazan, Saddam’s half-brother, asked me if I were willing to go to Washington to represent them -- a quasi diplomatic post. Events interceded and the subject never came up again. Years after, I was told that Saddam himself vetoed my appointment. According to my informers Saddam came to the conclusion that I would not be an effective middle man unless relations between the two countries were good and everything he knew pointed in the other direction.

Early in 1978, the Establishment of Television and Cinema solicited my help in “obtaining the cooperation of an international film director to edit the 6 hour series called The Long Days, a thinly disguised biography of Saddam. It was an easy request and my friend Terrence Young (The 1 st and 2 nd 007s, and Wait Until Dark) journeyed to Baghdad and was hired as consultant on the film. The absurdity of spending so much time, money and energy on this project was obvious, it had been shown before. I kept looking for signs of discontent among Iraqi’s bureaucrats. There was non available to the naked eye. Absolute power was doing the job of holding Iraq together and it allowed Saddam to air his life story twice. Absolute power was Saddam Hussein.

With time the man who used to wander the streets of Baghdad on his own was no more. He was replaced by a man who reduced life to farce, in no more than six months. Soon after he summoned me to his office for a meeting, the only one I ever had with him. He asked to explain the system of checks and balances in America. When the time to leave came, I had to walk backwards to leave his office. Already seeing him was like seeing a monarch. And in this case the King had many incompetent and corrupt relatives who assumed high office and began running the country. This is when the Ba’ath Party was replaced by Saddam’s Tikriti monarchy. This was the beginning of the end.

The end of Saddam the thinking populist took place under our very eyes. Feeling beleaguered he became the head of a backward tribe who ran a wealthy promising kingdom. Very much like dictators who need, or pretend to need, to re-present their personas to their people, Saddam had something up his sleeve. He ordered in acceleration in his unconventional weapons program. It appeared to give him a sense of personal security.

There was no shortage of companies willing to help, including the dummy company created by the UK government to spy on him. Once again the governments in the United States and United Kingdom knew what he was doing.

Saddam was a criminal who fooled a whole generation of Arabs. After Nasser, he presided over the one Arab country which offered us hope but it was a tarnished dream similar in nature to what Hilter and Stalin offered their followers. We were not fooled, we were fools. Dictators do not stop; they are stopped. Along with other Iraqi elements we were unable to do the job of controlling or removing the monster we created. It was outside supporters, the Western powers who had the power to stop him and remove him. The only honour we can claim is that our purpose, the building of a state that would be a military counterweight to Israel was an honourable one. In the case if the United States and the United Kingdom their first pro-Saddam movers were motivated by greed. The second one was cynical, he became their proxy in fighting Khomeini. The third stage began with Saddam’s failure to gain America’s trust, what culminated in the invasion of Kuwait. Now the United States and the United Kingdom do not stop at pretending to occupy moral high ground. By hiding their original complicity in providing Saddam with unconventional weapons they are lying to us. They are also treating us with disdain as when they claim Saudi Arabia is going to lead a new pro-democracy movement. They are telling us they are entitled to eliminate others: Abu Mazen for Arafat and Ahmed Chalabi for Saddam. The United States and the United Kingdom are re-colonizing the Middle East. In the process they will elevate Saddam to the position he always craved, the one modern Saladin who stood up to the West. We live in an evil hour.

© Said K Aburish